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Abstract
Empirical studies attempting at testing dualism in developing countries often rely
on an ex-ante definition of the primary and the secondary sector. Many times this
methodology causes biases in the estimation due to sample selection problems. Also,
such definitions may be arbitrary sometimes. We use twenty seven years of Household
Data in order to test for the existence dual labor markets in Argentina. We estimated
an endogenous switching model with unknown regime without defining ex-ante sector
attachment. We find evidence of dualism for both periods analyzed. However, the
differences between the two sectors have significantly changed over time. Finally, our
estimations also corroborate the fact that using the usual ex-ante definition of sector
attachment may not be adequate for testing dualism.
1 Introduction
The literature on labor market segmentation and dualism claims that labor markets can be
characterized by the existence of two sectors and a rationing mechanism that prevents some
workers from entering one sector by non economic barriers. One of the sectors is called
“primary sector” in which individuals enjoy higher wages and returns to schooling, longer
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2tenure and on the job training. The other is named “secondary sector” where wages, returns
to schooling, on the job training and tenure are much lower. Moreover, there are some non
economic barriers that prevent some of the secondary workers from obtaining primary jobs.
In this sense, such literature is seen as a departure from classical human capital theory
where individuals in low paid jobs are considered low productivity workers unwilling to
acquire the necessary skills to access better paid jobs. Such individuals may also be unable
to acquire such skills due to market imperfections, credit constraints, etc. The principal
policy implication of human capital theory is that individuals should have all the tools and
incentives available in order to acquire more skills.
In contrast, dual market supporters state that high wage jobs in the primary sector are
rationed, and some groups -women, minorities, young workers, etc. - may face non-economic
barriers to the entry. If labor markets behave in such way, then training will not eliminate
barriers to access to primary sector jobs. In this case, the most direct policy implication
would be the provision of income maintenance programs for groups facing rationing. 1
Finally, another assertion of dual market supporters is that dualism fits the main features
of labor markets in developing countries. Testing whether labor markets are segmented or
if they behave according to human capital theory is important, since the policy implications
for classical human capital theory and dualism differ.
However, such tests are difficult, since they involve proving the existence of two different
wage setting mechanisms and barriers to the access to primary sector jobs. There are
different approaches for testing dualism: one based on analysis of job-factor characteristics,
a second one based on an ex ante definition of sectors and estimation of different wage
equations and a third one, where the sector attachment of the worker is not observed but
estimated.
The first two approaches have been used extensively both in developed and developing
countries. For the case of developing countries, most of the existing work relies on the
first two methodologies. When the testing method depends on an a priori definition of
the worker’s sector, the definition of primary and secondary sector adopted is of great
1In the most recent literature about dualism, there is some scope for training and minimizing the extent
of the secondary sector, but the main policy implication mentioned above remains valid.
3importance for two reasons: in terms of policy implications and because of the bias in the
estimation which may arise as a consequence of using a definition which does not match
primary and secondary jobs.
The distinction between workers in each sector differs according to different authors.
For example, for some developing countries, primary workers are sometimes defined as the
ones working in capital intensive sectors while secondary workers are those working in labor
intensive jobs as agriculture. In others, like some of the biggest Latin American countries
for example, primary jobs tend to be associated with stable employment, bigger firms and
the industrial sector. Secondary jobs tend to be concentrated in smaller establishments,
generally associated with the underground economy. The former jobs are sometimes labeled
as “formal” jobs, while the latter are labeled as “informal”.
However, the fact that more low paid workers are concentrated in specific sectors of the
economy is not enough to justify that all workers employed in that sector are informal. For
example, while construction workers are generally low paid workers in developing countries
and can be regarded as secondary workers, the claim that all workers in the construction
sector are secondary workers is difficult to sustain.
Argentina represents an ideal case to test the hypothesis of dualism due to three reasons.
First, as a developing country and according to dualism’s claims, it should fit the dual labor
market features. Secondly, its labor market has suffered major transformations in the last
decade, so we can inquire about the change in the structure of labor markets and look at
what happened to the size of the secondary sector. Finally, there are Household Surveys
available for almost three decades with information that allows us to identify workers with
lower wages as well as other individual characteristics which could, in principle, be regarded
as secondary workers. The survey has information whether the worker is paid social security
benefits by its employer (social security benefits include health benefits, pensions, insurance
against working hazard, etc.). Enjoying such benefits is highly correlated with the fact that
the employer is operating in the underground economy or not, and in principle, could be
used as an indicator for an a priori definition of being in the primary sector. Henceforth,
we will address the workers who enjoy social security benefits as “formal workers” and
“informal” the ones who do not.
4This paper attempts at testing the existence of dualism, i.e.: the existence of two wage
setting mechanisms and evidence of rationing in the access to jobs in the primary sector, the
evolution of primary and secondary sectors over time and finally, whether informal workers
can be considered secondary workers.
Using micro data for the main urban area of Argentina between 1975 and 2001, we esti-
mate an endogenous switching model with unknown regimes and then address the problem
of rationing. Our results suggest that there is evidence of dualism for the different subpe-
riods considered and that the size of the secondary sector changed over time. Finally we
show that there exists some degree of correlation between informal workers and secondary
workers, but not all informal workers can be considered secondary workers, which supports
the idea that dualism should not be tested using an a priori definition of sectors.
It represents a contribution to the existing literature about dualism in developing coun-
tries, both by addressing the issue of rationing and by circumventing the problem of using
an a priori definition of sector attachment. Moreover, it provides some insights useful for
policy implications.
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents a literature review, section 3
presents a test for the existence of dual labor markets in Argentina. Sections 4 and 5
present the description of the data and the estimation procedure respectively. Section 6
presents the results and finally Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature review
Literature on dualism and labor market segmentation is vast both in empirical and theo-
retical terms. In what follows we focus on the one that is most relevant for this paper. We
make a summary of the empirical literature, for the US and also for developing countries.2
We also make some brief mention to theoretical models which generate a dual economy and
may have interesting testable implications.
Literature on dualism started with the seminal work of Doeringer and Piore (1971).
The main idea of the authors is the existence of an administrative unit, firm or plant called
2For a complete survey of empirical work on dual labor markets, see Dickens and Lang (1992). A summary
of theoretical models addressing dualism appears in Saint Paul (1996).
5“internal labor market”, where both price and allocation of labor is dictated by a set of
rules and procedures which can be distinguished from the ones ruling conventional economic
theory. Access to internal labor markets is not always available to workers in external labor
markets due to the existence of rigidities in the rules governing the pricing and allocation of
labor within them. Such rigidities make internal labor markets to have a different dynamic
from the one predicted by conventional economic theory. According to the authors internal
labor markets “can provide a more efficient form of market organization than competitive
markets whenever fixed labor costs and economies of recruitment, screening and training
are present”. Internal labor markets correspond to what the authors called “primary sec-
tor”employment, with high wages, stable employment and on the job training. In contrast,
there are other jobs outside internal labor markets called “secondary sector”jobs which are
characterized by low wages, bad working conditions, and unstable employment. One key
element of their theory is the fact that rationing exists in the primary sector and, in the
case of the US, some minorities, women and blacks can be segregated.
After the original work on dualism, literature evolved theoretically and empirically. As
far as theoretical models are concerned, dualism was explained by modeling deviations
from market clearing which could give rise to it. The basic model explaining dualism is an
extension from the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) model of efficiency wages. In the Shapiro
and Stiglitz model firms pay workers above marginal product of labor because monitoring
technology is costly. Wages are higher than marginal product in order for the firm to elicit
work effort from their employees. At the market wage level, workers “shirk”. The higher
penalty that a firm can impose on a worker is firing him, the higher the wage, the higher
the cost of losing the job will be. If market cleared, the cost of losing a job to the worker
would be zero and he would immediately find another job at the same wage. In their
efficiency wage model, Shapiro and Stiglitz show that there is involuntary unemployment,
since unemployed workers cannot underbid employed ones, the employer knows that they
would shirk if paid below efficiency wage levels.
The modification of the basic efficiency wage model in order to account for dualism
is done by Bulow and Summers (1986) by extending it to a two sector model, one with
monitoring costs -sector one or primary sector- and another one without them -sector 2 or
6secondary. While the latter will pay competitive wages, the former one will pay a wage above
market clearing level, for the same reasons of the efficiency wage model. To workers, the
value of being in the secondary sector equals the value of being unemployed. In this sense,
Bulow and Summers do not generate involuntary unemployment, but workers in sector 2
would like to be employed in the primary sector but cannot bid down wages. In equilibrium,
wages in sector 1 are higher than wages in sector 2. While jobs in sector 1 are rationed, jobs
in sector 2 are not. Moreover, if wages are correlated with some observable characteristics
of the workers which are uncorrelated to productivity (women, young workers, workers
with higher turnover, etc.), equally productive workers can be allocated in the primary or
secondary sector arbitrarily.
The dual model of Bulow and Summers is then extended by Saint-Paul (1996), who
collects all the theoretical models which explain the coexistence of “good” (primary sector)
and “bad” (secondary sector) jobs within the same economy. Saint-Paul adds a firing
cost structure to the Bulow and Summers model and shows that in the presence of firing
costs for primary sector workers, the existence of a secondary sector provides “flexibility
to the economy”. Dualism arises endogenously within the firms in response to demand
fluctuations.
In terms of empirical work attempting at testing dualism we can identify two different
kind of studies. While one of them assumes that workers in the secondary sector can be
identified, the other considers they cannot.
Initially, most analysis took the first approach, either by analyzing job or workers char-
acteristics or by calculating interindustry or inter-occupation wage differentials. Dickens
and Katz (1987) survey the existing literature on wage differentials which look at wage
premia across industries and also provide their own evidence of such differential, finding
correlation of certain attributes such as low wages and bad working conditions. Another
set of studies aims at studying the existence of different wage setting mechanisms (Oster-
man (1976), Wright (1979) and Heckman and Hotz (1986)). As mentioned above, all these
studies rely on an ex-ante definition of primary or secondary sectors. In general most of the
studies based in an ex-ante definition of primary and secondary sector generally conclude
that there are different wage setting mechanisms, some of them could fit the description of
7primary jobs, and some others, the secondary one. However, none of this studies provide a
sound proof of dualism claims, since the issue of rationing is not present. Two wage setting
mechanisms may be consistent with classical human capital theory if rationing does not
exist and individuals are free to move from one sector to another. The fact that is more
difficult to reconcile with human capital theory is the existence of rationing in jobs in the
primary sector, i.e. individuals who would like to work in the primary sector cannot find
jobs in it. Finally, an ex-ante definition of sector attachment also presents some potential
problems we explain next.
The second approach for testing dualism does not rely on an ex ante definition of sector
attachment. The first work of such kind is Dickens and Lang (1985). They state that an
ex-ante division of the sample brings about two potential problems. First, the problem of
sample selection, since the choice of occupation is not independent of unmeasured char-
acteristics. Second, assuming that all employees within a given industry are either in the
primary or in the secondary sector can also generate biases. For example, while fast food
chains in the US are associated with secondary employment, it is difficult to argue that top
managers in such sector are secondary workers. Their research is innovative in two senses:
first the probability of being in each sector is estimated, and second, a test of rationing is
conducted.
Dickens and Lang found evidence of segmentation, with a flat wage profile for the sec-
ondary sector, i.e.: no returns to education or to experience. They also prove the existence
of rationing, showing that workers in SMSA, married, highly educated and white are less
likely to work in the secondary sector.
After Dickens and Lang (1985) developed its testing methodology, this methodology has
been partially applied to some other countries, but the issue of rationing is often neglected.
The issue of rationing is important, since one of the striking facts about the so called
confrontation between classical human capital theory and segmentation is that it implies
that when markets do not clear the access to some specific sectors is subject to non price
rationing. Yet it is striking that most of the test trying to address the presence of segmen-
tation do not address the rationing issue. Job rationing in the primary sector jobs mean
that there are individuals queuing for such jobs.
8The existence of two wage setting mechanisms without knowing sector attachment is
explored later for the case of Chile by Basch and Paredes (1996). One of the main problems
in their analysis is that it does not include any test of rationing and while sector attachment
is estimated it is assumed to be uncorrelated with wage setting mechanisms, which may
induce biases, since unobserved heterogeneity affecting wage equations in either one or the
other sector are probably correlated with the probability of being in such sector.
Huguet Roig (1999) addressed the segmentation issue for Spain, by estimating an en-
dogenous switching model with unknown regime. She finds evidence of two wage setting
mechanisms for the case of Spain, but she makes no reference to the existence of rationing.
She also provides an accurate account of most of the recent empirical studies trying to test
dualism.
For the specific case of Argentina, Pratap and Quintin (2003), use Household data
for Argentina from 1993-1995 in order to evaluate semi-parametrically the hypothesis that
informal workers should expect higher wages in the formal sector. In order to account
for some of the problems which may be present in parametric estimation -such as sample
selection or model specification- they estimate a matching estimator and then a D-I-D
estimator. They rely on an ex ante definition of sectors, matching formal workers to workers
in the primary sector and informal workers to secondary ones.3. They find negative wage
premium for the formal (after controlling for personal characteristics) and cannot reject the
hypothesis of competitive markets. However, such wage premium is not directly related to
dualism but more to the problem of social security valuation. Finally, they do not address
whether there is any barrier to mobility between sectors or the existence of rationing.
3 A formal test for dualism in Argentina
3.1 Brief characterization of Labor Markets in Argentina
Argentina labor markets suffered major transformations during the last decade. Such trans-
formations were the consequence of profound changes in its economy since 1991, when a
stabilization plan together with a huge effort to reform and modernize the state were in-
3The same definition of formal and informal workers mentioned in the introduction applies here.
9troduced. The country had a long history of macroeconomic instability with high inflation
(including two hyperinflation episodes in the late 80’s), huge budget deficits, very rigid
regulations in the labor markets4, high real wage volatility, etc.5 However, unemployment
was low due to the fact that low wage employment in the public sector was an important
proportion of total employment, accounting for almost 30% of total employment in some
regions.
In 1991 a major stabilization plan was introduced, establishing a currency board which
pegged the currency to the US dollar. This stabilization plan was followed by trade liberal-
ization, an ambitious privatization program and privatization of the Social Security System.
The results were impressive in terms of inflation as it can be observed in Figure 1. Also, the
program showed initial success in terms of GDP growth. However, labor markets started
showing new features that had been unknown in the country. One of them was a sharp in-
crease in unemployment together with an increase in labor informality, as shown in Figures
2 and 3. We can divide our 1975-2001 data sample in two clear different periods according
to the evolution of labor markets. One with low unemployment and low informality which
lasts until 1991, and a second one of high unemployment and informality starting in 1992.
3.2 Hypothesis
We want to test two different things:
• the hypothesis that labor markets behave differently in 1975-1991 and from 1992
afterwards, more specifically, they behave as competitive markets in the first period
and start fitting dual market claims in the second period.
• whether informal workers, as defined for Argentina, can be considered secondary work-
ers.
In order to test our first hypothesis, we must show the existence of two different wage
setting mechanisms, or two wage equations, one for the primary sector with higher returns
4Taxes on labor amount 30% of wages, firing cost are very high and accidents in the labor place are costly
to the employer because they can be taken to civil courts, where the amount of the compensation has no
monetary limit.
5Menendez (1999) provides a good account of wage evolution for Argentina.
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to schooling, experience and tenure and one for the secondary sector, with lower (or even
statistically insignificant) returns to education and experience. Secondly, we have to conduct
a rationing test. Lastly, we must measure the degree of correlation between informal jobs
and jobs in the secondary sector.
4 Dataset
We used the Permanent Household Survey (PHS) conducted by the National Institute of
Statistics and Census (INDEC) for the period 1975-2001. For all the years except for the
1975-1980 period there are two surveys (May-October) per year. Our sample is restricted
to the City of Buenos Aires and Greater Buenos Aires area (GBA), since this is the only
area where data is available since 1975. The area considered is the biggest Argentine urban
area, comprising 34% of population and generating 60% of total income.
The sample is a cross-section until 1994 and a rotating panel afterwards. Working with
such a long data span presents both advantages and drawbacks. The main one is the tradeoff
between the number of years available to test our model and the quality of data available
for each year. On one hand, it allows us to test the model we estimate over a long period
of time, looking at trends and changes in the different parameters. On the other hand,
the quality of the information is relatively poor before 1994, specially since we do not have
information that would be useful in our estimation. For example, information for social
security benefits (which allows us to split our sample between formal and informal workers)
is only available for salaried workers and not for self employed individuals. Moreover, labor
income for the self employed is very badly recorded as well as the number of hours worked.
Finally, information about the county where individuals live, which can be correlated to the
kind of job they hold, is only available after 1994. To sum up, the only variables that are
available throughout the whole sample are: labor income for the “main occupation” (more
than 15 hours per week), hours worked, years of education, age, social security benefits and
tenure in the occupation6.
In order to maximize the amount of information available we restricted the sample to
6This last information refers to the time they have been working in the same occupation.
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salaried workers employed in the private sector, between the ages of 15 and 65. Also, we
just consider the workers’ primary occupation, for people working between 15 and 80 hours
per week. Finally, the sample only comprises male workers, since female participation on
the labor force changed significantly over the period under consideration.
The descriptive statistics of the sample appear in Tables 1 and 2 in the appendix.
5 Estimation
5.1 Endogenous switching model with unknown regime
We will estimate the following system of equations which comprises two wage equations,
one for the primary sector (p) and other for the secondary sector (s) and a third equation,
the switching (w) equation which measures the probability of being in the primary sector.
Wip = X ′iβp + uip (1)
Wis = X ′iβs + uis (2)
D = X ′iβw + uiw (3)
Wi =
 Wip if D > 0Wis if D ≤ 0 (4)
where the Wij are individuals log of hourly wages for j = p, s, X ′i are are non stochastic
regressors, βj are coefficients for j = p, s, w and u′ij are normally distributed error terms.
Equation (1) corresponds to the wage equation if the individual is in the primary sector,
equation (2) is the wage if the individual is in the secondary sector and (3) is the switching
equation. Wip, Wis and D are latent variables, and, if uiw > −X ′iβw the individual’s wage
is determined by equation (1) while if uiw ≤ −X ′iβw the individual’s wage is determined by
(2).
The variance covariance matrix for this system is:
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Σ =

σ2p σps σpw
σsp σ
2
s σsw
σpw σsw 1
 (5)
where σ2w has been normalized to one.
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The likelihood function of this problem is given by:
Pr(uiw > −X ′iβw | Xi, uip) · f(uip) + Pr(uiw ≤ −X ′iβw | Xi, uis) · f(uis) (6)
f() is the density function of uip and uis.
Under normality assumption for uip, uis and uiw, the log likelihood becomes:
lnL =
n∑
i=1
{ln[1− Φ(
−Xiβw − ρpwσp (Wpi −Xiβp)
(1− ρ2pw)1/2
)] · 1
σp
φ(
(Wpi −Xiβp)
σp
))+
Φ(
−Xiβw − ρswσs (Ysi −Xiβs)
(1− ρ2sw)1/2
) · 1
σs
φ(
(Ysi −Xiβs)
σs
))} (7)
where Φ(·) and φ(·) are, respectively, the distribution function and the density of a
standard normal, ρpw and ρsw are the correlation coefficients between (up, uw) and (us, uw).
We normalized σ2w to one, as mentioned above.
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We can estimate (βj , γ,Σ, ρj,w), j = p, s by maximum likelihood using search algorithms.
The variables used as regressors in the three equations were: schooling level, tenure,
dummy for married, potential experience (calculated as age - years of schooling -6), expe-
rience squared and year dummies. D is also estimated, since we do not use any a priori
definition of sectors.
We performed different sets of estimations: standard Mincer equations using OLS for
every year of the sample, pooling the data into two periods and then one estimation for the
whole sample. Then we estimated a model of endogenous switching with unknown regime
7In this model we cannot identify simultaneously the coefficients of the switching equation and its error
variance. For a discussion on this issue see Nelson (1972), Maddala (1979).
8Since the likelihood function does not depend explicitly on σps, this is not identified.
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as in Maddala and Nelson (1975)9. Unfortunately, we did not achieve convergence in the
year by year estimation. We estimated the results for the whole sample and then for the
different sub periods. We performed estimations restricting the schooling coefficients to
remain constant (restricted model) within each period and allowing then to vary year by
year (unrestricted model). We then conducted rationing test for each period.
6 Results
Tables 3 and 4 present the results for the estimation of the OLS and the unrestricted switch-
ing model for the dual market hypothesis for the first and the second period respectively.
For the first period considered (Table 3) the returns to schooling for the OLS estimation are
6% for the first two years and then they increase afterwards, averaging 9%. Being married
and tenure have a positive effect on wages and potential experience and experience squared
have the usual signs observed in standard Mincer equations. Holding all the other factors
constant in the sample means, married individuals earn 6% more and an extra year of tenure
increases wages by 2%.
In terms of the switching model, we present the results for the unrestricted version. The
restricted estimation, which states that the schooling coefficient is constant across years is
rejected. (Twice the difference between the constrained and the unconstrained model is
568,873.8, which rejects the hypothesis of constant schooling coefficient across the years.)
For the sample average, individuals in the secondary sector earn 19% less than their primary
peers.10
The schooling coefficient for the primary sector is higher for some years with respect
to that of the secondary sector. In 1975, returns to schooling are 5.6% and 3.4% in the
primary and secondary sector respectively. Over the period, returns to education increase
in the primary sector, reaching 8% in the last year of the period. In the secondary sector,
returns also increase, but less than in the primary sector (4.1% in 1988). An extra year of
education with respect to the sample mean raises wages by 5% in the primary sector and
9A detailed explanation of the estimation procedure can be seen in the appendix.
10All the calculations are for the means of 1975 and 1992 in each period, but the magnitude of the results
do not change if another year is used.
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3% in the secondary sector.
An extra year of tenure increases wages by 1% and 2.6% in the primary and in the
secondary sector respectively. Wages corresponding to married individuals are 20% higher
in the primary sector. Also, being married also raises wages more in the primary sector:
a married individual earns 19% more in the primary sector and just 12% in the secondary
sector. The coefficients of the switching equation -which indicates the probability of being
in the primary sector- indicate that being married, having a longer job tenure, education
and experience increase the probability of being in the primary sector.
For the first period considered we reject the null of only one wage setting mechanism in
favor of the two wage setting mechanisms by conducting a likelihood ratio test.
When we look at the OLS estimation for the second period (Table 4), returns to schooling
increased with respect to the OLS estimation for the previous period. Also, after 1994
returns to education increase, peaking 10.8% in 2001. All the rest of the coefficients have
the conventional signs.
Married individuals have wages 5% higher than non-married individuals. Besides, an
extra year of tenure increases wages by only 1%.
Again, we focus our comments on the unrestricted version of the switching model for the
dual market, since a likelihood ratio test also rejected the hypothesis of constant coefficients
for schooling. The primary sector shows higher returns to education with respect to both
the OLS estimation and the secondary sector in the switching model. Returns for 1992
are 13%. In the secondary sector, returns to schooling are lower (3.3%). While by the
end of the period, returns in the primary sector are 16%, they are 8.2% in the secondary
one. While the latter are just half of the value for the primary sector they doubled with
respect to the ones observed in the beginning of the period. An extra year of education with
respect to the sample mean raises wages by 5.3% in the primary sector and only 0.7% in the
secondary sector. While - conditional on being in one sector- wages are higher for married
individuals, the differential between married individuals from switching from the secondary
to the primary sector is 14%. For unmarried individuals this differential is similar (13%).
Average wages are 14% higher in the primary sector.
As far is the switching equation is concerned, schooling, tenure and being married in-
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crease the probability of being in the primary sector.
For the second period, our estimations also support the existence of two different wage
setting mechanisms, as evidenced by a likelihood ratio test.
The endogenous switching models estimated confirm the hypothesis of two wage setting
mechanisms for each period considered. The differences between the returns to schooling
for each sector are significantly higher for the second period than for the first one. How-
ever, while in the second period the wage differential between the primary and the secondary
sector is always positive, for the second period is negative for lower level of schooling (when-
ever years of schooling is lower than 7 years (which in Argentina corresponds to elementary
education).
As far as the switching equation for both periods, the signs or the estimated coeffi-
cients are the same, but its magnitude cannot be compared between periods because of the
normalization we imposed. We move on to explore if there is evidence of rationing.
6.1 Rationing tests
The second claim of dual market theory is that there is rationing to primary sector jobs, a
fact which cannot be accounted for using standard human capital theory. In order to test
the existence of rationing or non economic barriers to primary jobs, we have to define first
a rule for allocating workers in the primary or secondary sector when there is no rationing.
In this section, we follow closely Dickens and Lang (1985). They perform a rationing
test for the US. As they do, we assume that experience in one sector raises wages in such
sector, more than it does in the other one. Workers behave as utility maximizers over their
lifetime. With perfect information about job characteristics and constant non-pecuniary
tastes for jobs, one individual should choose one sector and remain there his entire working
life.
In the absence of rationing, a worker chooses primary sector if (assuming that non
pecuniary aspects of employment do not change over time) NPVip > NPVis, i.e. the net
present value of working in the primary sector exceeds a compensating differential k.
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We can write the probability that a worker is on the primary sector as:
P = Pr[ln(NPVip)− ln(NPVis) > k] (8)
where the subscripts p and s are primary and secondary sector respectively. We approximate
ln(NPVij) by Wij . We write again our two wage equations (one for each sector):
Wip = X ′iβp + uip (9)
Wis = X ′iβp + uis (10)
where Wij are log of hourly wages in each sector, Xi is a vector of individual character-
istics already used and uij are normally distributed error for each sector.
Pr{X ′i(βp − βs + βw) + uip − uis + uiw > −k′} (11)
k′ can be considered a constant plus a normally distributed error term if we assume that
individuals’ tastes with respect to non-pecuniary aspects of employment do not vary with
observable characteristics.
We may test that people choose their sector of employment to maximize their utility.
We estimate an equation for sector membership by testing restrictions on coefficients on
the switching equation and test whether βw is equal to zero.
X ′i(βp − βs + βw) + k′ + uip − uis + uiw (12)
We test if the coefficients for βw corresponding to schooling is equal to zero and to
the difference between the corresponding coefficients in the primary and secondary wage
equations.11. We are imposing constraints in all the schooling coefficients: 12 constraints
for the first period and 10 for the second period, but we relax the normalization of σ2w = 1.
The degrees of freedom are 11 and 9 respectively for each period.
11Preferences for non pecuniary aspects of primary sector employment may be related to some workers
characteristics (for example, married or older male workers may have a greater taste for primary employment,
while females and young workers may prefer to enter the secondary sector), it may be the case that some
coefficients in the switching regression are different from zero even in the absence of rationing
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Using likelihood ratio tests, both hypothesis are rejected (Twice the difference between
the log likelihood between the constrained and the unconstrained model is 508.003,6 and
569.896 for each period respectively when we test the restrictions that the coefficients of the
switching equation are zero and 894.021,8 and 965.874 when we test whether the difference
between the coefficients of the primary and secondary sector equals the coefficients of the
switching equation), rejecting the our null hypothesis.12
We have different explanations for our results. For the first period, the wage differential
between the primary and the secondary is always positive regardless the educational level
of the individuals. Our results suggest that the fraction of workers in the primary sector
rises with education more rapidly than expected. This implies that either workers with low
education are rationed or highly educated workers are more averse to secondary employment.
For the second period, our results of the previous section indicated that the wage differ-
ential between the primary and secondary sector is negative for individuals with less than
seven years of schooling, which in Argentina corresponds to incomplete elementary educa-
tion. This latter fact makes the rationing argument for low educated people less compelling,
since wages in the secondary sector are higher than in the primary one for less educated
people./par In order to venture some explanation for our results, we will calculate the size
of the secondary sector and check which is the composition of such sector.
6.2 Predictions of the model
If the hypothesis of dual labor model is accepted for both periods, the model can be used
to test the composition of the secondary sector. Applying Bayes’ theorem, we can calculate
the probability that a worker i is in the primary sector as:
Pr(uiw > −X ′iβw | X ′i, uip)
Pr(uiw > −X ′iβw | X ′i, uip) + Pr(uiw ≤ −X ′iβw | X ′i, uis)
(13)
which gives us the probability that a worker is in the primary sector conditional on the
observed wages and personal characteristics. The percentage of workers is calculated by
computing the average of primary sector attachment for all workers. Using this formula we
12Some of the parameters under the null for a test of a single vs. dual markets are not identified, which
invalidates the likelihood ratio tests.
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can calculate the ex-post probability of being in the secondary sector conditional on different
individual characteristics and observed wages and also, the percentage of secondary workers
for a given category.
Tables 5 and 6 allow us to calculate such values for each sector for the first and the
second period respectively.
According to our calculations, 35% and 72% of male workers are in the secondary sector
in each period. 13
The first remarkable fact is that the percentage of secondary workers predicted by the
model is different from the number of informal workers observed in the sample for both
periods considered.
Also, some other interesting facts are observed: the percentage of married workers in
the secondary sector is lower than the percentage of married workers in the whole sample.
Moreover, the proportion of secondary workers who are married is much lower than the
percentage of married workers in the sample for both periods considered. Secondary workers
tend to have less education than the proportion of workers in the complete sample, and most
of the secondary workers have incomplete high-school or less years of education. The same
applies for ages of workers. The proportion of young workers in the secondary sector is
higher than for the whole sample.
One interesting aspect to mention is that of formal workers and the secondary sector:
the proportion of formal workers among secondary workers is lower than for the whole
sample in both periods (41% vs. 83% for the first period and 32% vs. 70% for the second
period). Additionally, the proportion of secondary workers who are formal is lower, but it
is positive and far from negligible. This gives us some idea of why it may not appropriate
to resort to an ex-ante definition of sector attachment when we are interested in testing for
the existence dualism.
6.3 Informal workers vs. secondary workers.
The switching model we estimated supports the hypothesis of the existence of two sectors
primary and secondary for Argentina for both periods analyzed and rejects the hypothesis
13Standard error for these values have not been calculated
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of free choice of sector. As mentioned before, the different estimations were conducted
without assuming any ex-ante sector attachment -the separation in the switching regime
was unknown- and so D has to be estimated. The information available in Argentina
about formality of the workers could be used in principle as an ex-ante definition of sector
attachment. In general, informal workers are paid lower wages,14 and have higher rotation
in their jobs. The indicator of formality could be used to split the sample and test for the
presence of dual labor markets in the Argentine economy by means of an ex-ante definition
of sectors and then compare both models.
However, we would like to use the information available about informality in order to
see to which degree secondary workers are informal workers.
As we observed before in tables 5 and 6, the proportion of formal workers is lower in the
secondary sector with respect to the percentage of formal workers in the sample for each
period considered. Moreover the proportion of formal workers as a proportion of secondary
workers is much lower. This gives an idea that while there is less formality in secondary
jobs, its value is not zero. Based on the predictions of the probabilities calculated using
13, using an ex-ante definition of formal-informal workers to study market dualism is not
entirely correct.
In order to explore this relationship further we estimate again the same endogenous
switching model with unknown separation regime for both periods with the only difference
that an indicator for formality in both wage equations and in the switching equation as well
was added. Results can be observed in tables 7 and 8.
The indicator of formality is positive and significant in both wage equations and also
affects positively the probability of being in the primary sector. The effect of formality on
wages in the secondary sector is higher than in the primary sector.
However, this estimation encounters the problem of endogeneity of formality, since it is
hard to argue that the decision of working in the primary sector has no effect on formality.
In order to overcome such problem we attempted a joint estimation of a modified switch-
ing model, trying to obtain the probabilities of being formal/informal conditioned on being
14Most studies show that after controlling from selection and individual characteristic the compensating
differential between informal and formal workers for Argentina is negative. See Brassiolo et al. (2003).
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in the primary or secondary sector.15 Unfortunately, we did not achieve convergence of the
the algorithms used to estimate this models.
7 Conclusions
The paper had two main objectives. First, to test dual labor market claims for two different
historical periods in Argentina between 1970 and 1990 and between 1991 and 2000 and then
to check if informal workers (defined as workers who do not receive social security benefits)
can be considered secondary workers for the same periods (or, in other words if it was
appropriate to test dualism using an a priori definition of sector attachment).
For the first purpose, we tested two different things: first, whether two wage equations
(one for the primary sector and other for the secondary sector) fit the data better than
one and secondly, whether primary sector jobs are rationed. We started by estimating an
endogenous switching regime with an unknown separation regime for each period. Results
provide evidence of segmentation in both periods, against our priors of perfect competition
in labor markets for the first period. These results are achieved without resorting to an
ex-ante definition of sector attachment for conducting the estimations. This proves the first
claim of dual labor market theory. As regards the issue of rationing, we are able to reject
the hypothesis of free choice for the schooling coefficient. Unfortunately, the fact that we
are restricting the sample to males only does not allow us to test women segregation or
any other issues related to rationing. However, for individuals with less than elementary
schooling, wages in the secondary sector are higher than in the primary sector for the second
period, so rationing may be affecting people with intermediate levels of education.
In order to see to what extent informal workers in Argentina can be regarded as sec-
ondary workers, we observed that while the proportion of formal workers in the secondary
sector and the number of formal workers in it are smaller than in the sample, this number
15We attempted the estimation of the following likelihood function:
pf ∗ (Pr(uiw > −X ′iβw | Xi, formal, uip) · f(uip)) + pi ∗ (Pr(uiw > −X ′iβw | Xi, informal, uip) · f(uip))+
+(1−pf )∗Pr(uiw ≤ −X ′iβw | Xi, formaluis)·f(uis)+(1−pi)∗Pr(uiw ≤ −X ′iβw | Xi, formaluis)·f(uis)
where pf and pi are the probabilities of being formal and informal respectively, and we assumed them
constant.
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is not zero, so as a first approximation to the issue of using an ex-ante definition of sector
we can conclude that such classification may not be adequate.
In terms of exploring the possible ways of causation between informality and secondary
jobs, we did not obtain any conclusive answer, since our estimations faced the problem of
endogeneity of the indicator for formality. We tried an estimation which took care of this
problem but could not obtain results.
The paper represents a contribution to the labor market literature in developing coun-
tries in two different areas. First, it is the first study of segmentation available for developing
countries using such a long data span, since most of existing studies are restricted to cross
sectional data for some specific years, which can be problematic when we are working with
countries subject to large demand volatility, as it may be the case with some developing
countries. Secondly, it provides some evidence of segmentation that does not rely on an
ex-ante definition of primary and secondary jobs and further supports the evidence that
such divisions may be inappropriate (at least for the case of Argentina).
In terms of policy implications, it provides some interesting insights, since the model
predicts the existence of formal and informal workers both in the primary and secondary
sector. However, formal and informal workers earn less in the secondary sector, which may
support the idea that it may be more important to look at the wage levels and provide
income support for low income individuals than to focus on labor informality.
On the possible extensions of this work, the issue of rationing should be further explored
for both the literature about dualism and for the specific case of Argentina. In the later
case, it is also worth exploring the effects of labor demand volatility, inflation and labor
market rigidities and their interaction with the informal and secondary sector.
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A Estimation
We conducted the estimation of the endogenous switching model with unknown regime
using standard Maximum Likelihood Search algorithms. The non linearity of the system
and the fact that the log likelihood function is not globally concave made convergence
difficult. While it would have been ideal to conduct year by year estimation of the switching
model, convergence was not achieved for most of the years. For that reason, results are not
presented, even for the few years that converged. Instead an estimation pooling the data
for each period was conducted. We added year dummies and also allowed the schooling
coefficient to vary over time. We present the results pooling the data for each period with
the year dummies and allowing the school coefficient to vary each year. We also estimated
a restricted version where the schooling coefficient was forced to be constant across years
within each period. A likelihood ratio rejects the null that the restrictions are valid.
Since the function is not globally concave, it had several local maxima. That is why
we estimated it using different algorithms and trying different starting values. Given the
difficulties that arose in the estimation, we tried different algorithms to check if results were
robust to the change in them. The algorithms used in the Maximum Likelihood estimation
were Berndt et al. and Newton-Raphston. We found several local maxima and had to
experiment different starting values until we found a maximum. As mentioned above,
achieving convergence was difficult even for the pooled periods. First OLS regressions were
estimated and the coefficients obtained were used as starting values in a second step of
estimation, that of an exogenous switching model (covariances between wage and switching
equations were set to zero). Finally, we used the coefficients of the exogenous switching
regime as starting values for our endogenous switching regime estimation. The starting
vector for the dependent variable in the switching equation was set to zero. The results
we are presenting are estimated using the Newton-Raphston algorithm and the sequences
specified above. The number of iterations until convergence was 25 (restricted model for
the nineties), 85 (restricted model for the 70’s and 80’s), 96 (unrestricted model for the 70’s
and 80’s) and 143 (unrestricted model for the 90’s).
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Table 3: Estimation Results for the 1970s and 1980s
OLS Switching model
Primary Sector Secondary Sector Switching
Prob (being in PS)
married 0.152 0.201 0.111 0.062
(12.54)** (4.26)** (6.47)** (0.63)
tenure 0.021 0.008 0.026 0.049
(20.89)** (2.04)* (9.01)** (1.51)
school 0.057 0.056 0.034 0.231
(20.95)** (2.27)* (5.36)** (9.33)**
y76school 0.009 -0.035 -0.002 -0.035
(2.07)* (1.47) (0.17) (0.69)
y77school 0.02 -0.032 -0.009 0.009
(4.28)** (1.30) (0.89) (0.21)
y78school 0.035 -0.01 -0.004 -0.007
(7.38)** (0.40) (0.37) (0.15)
y80school 0.035 -0.014 -0.005 0.004
(9.06)** (0.65) (0.53) (0.11)
y81school 0.039 0.003 0.011 -0.077
(7.91)** (0.12) (1.09) (2.03)*
y82school 0.043 0.013 -0.008 0.005
(8.52)** (0.56) (0.71) (0.13)
y83school 0.041 0.014 0.013 -0.049
(7.06)** (0.51) (1.24) (1.13)
y84school 0.031 -0.033 -0.005 0.006
(5.73)** (0.99) (0.49) (0.12)
y85school 0.032 0.00 0.005 -0.049
(7.37)** (0.01) (0.54) (1.24)
y86school 0.035 0.016 0.017 0.052
(8.23)** (0.74) (2.06)* (0.74)
y88school 0.046 0.024 0.007 0.061
(10.86)** (1.17) (0.64) (0.90)
experience 0.032 0.027 0.024 0.015
(24.43)** (5.34)** (11.32)** (1.54)
experience2 -0.001 -0.001 0.00 0.00
(20.73)** (4.93)** (11.79)** (1.37)
Constant 1.675 2.275 1.961 (3.87)
(65.28)** (4.84)** (39.76)** (10.61)**
Cov with -0.533 -0.222 (a)
switching eq
(3.43)** (5.95)**
Log likelihood -9896160.1 -9104295.2
Observations 18223 18163
t statistics in parentheses, dependent variable is log hourly wage
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
(a) normalized to 1
Year Dummies were included in the estimation
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Table 4: Estimation Results for 1990s
OLS Switching model
Primary Sector Secondary Sector Switching
Prob (being in PS)
married 0.128 0.150 0.140 0.102
(13.74)** (9.79)** (5.03)** (2.15)*
tenure 0.015 0.011 0.022 0.001
(31.98)** (9.94)** (5.09)** (0.15)
school 0.086 0.131 0.033 0.077
(31.04)** (22.60)** (3.51)** (3.65)**
y93school -0.002 0.002 0.003 0.005
(0.46) (0.35) (0.21) (0.19)
y94school 0.002 0.005 0.024 0.017
(0.52) (0.66) (2.02)* (0.68)
y95school 0.01 0.008 0.022 0.028
(2.67)** (1.21) (1.81) (1.16)
y96school 0.008 0.014 0.024 0.042
(2.20)* (1.98)* (2.11)* (1.77)
y97school 0.011 0.026 0.029 0.05
(2.98)** (3.78)** (2.53)* (2.03)*
y98school 0.017 0.025 0.040 0.049
(4.73)** (3.65)** (3.33)** (1.65)
y99school 0.011 0.018 0.029 0.040
(2.99)** (2.44)* (2.55)* (1.51)
y100school 0.02 0.032 0.040 0.085
(5.24)** (4.51)** (3.24)** (3.06)**
y101school 0.022 0.029 0.049 0.085
(5.91)** (3.68)** (4.15)** (1.77)
experience 0.025 0.028 0.015 0.007
(26.33)** (16.38)** (4.17)** (1.04)
experience2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(20.50)** (9.96)** (5.26)** (0.70)
Constant 1.088 0.392 1.241 -0.434
(35.78)** (4.70)** (19.09)** (2.39)*
Cov with 0.550 0.762 (a)
switching eq
(51.41)** (16.97)**
Log likelihood -24203742 -22470939
Observations 29074 29074
t statistics in parentheses, dependent variable is log hourly wage
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
(a) normalized to 1
Year Dummies were included in the estimation
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Table 7: Estimation Results for the 1970s and 1980s
Switching model
Primary Sector Secondary Sector Switching
Prob (being in PS)
married 0.214 0.116 0.135
(8.07)** (4.50)** (1.84)
formal 0.142 0.255 0.378
(3.91)** (8.35)** (2.79)**
tenure 0.017 0.051 0.045
(10.89)** (8.61)** (5.53)**
school 0.139 0.046 0.138
(33.54)** (13.13)** (11.89)**
experience 0.034 0.017 0.013
(13.04)** (4.65)** (1.31)
experience2 0.000 0.000 0.000
(8.55)** (4.63)** (0.64)
Constant 0.402 1.774 -2.233
(4.66)** (27.64)** (9.56)**
Cov with 0.583 0.530 (a)
switching eq (43.99)** (15.40)**
Log likelihood -8186782
Observations 16846
t statistics in parentheses, dependent variable is log hourly wage
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
(a) normalized to 1
Year Dummies were included in the estimation
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Table 8: Estimation Results for the 1990s
Switching model
Primary Sector Secondary Sector Switching
Prob (being in PS)
married 0.151 0.127 0.136
(9.36)** (6.31)** (2.95)**
formal 0.124 0.333 0.544
(7.24)** (15.23)** (10.11)**
tenure 0.01 0.022 0.006
(8.86)** (7.22)** (1.18)
school 0.156 0.059 0.14
(53.81)** (21.84)** (15.74)**
experience 0.028 0.015 0.01
(15.65)** (6.82)** (1.67)
experience2 0.00 0.00 0.00
(8.82)** (7.34)** (1.13)
Constant -0.025 1.616 -1.631
(0.44) (35.33)** (14.50)**
Cov with 0.544 0.574 (a)
switching eq (44.81)** (25.93)**
Log likelihood -21200716
Observations 28679
t statistics in parentheses, dependent variable is log hourly wage
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
(a) normalized to 1
Year Dummies were included in the estimation
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